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Research Article
Humans, like other socialized species, must work together 
to manage the exploitation of valuable but finite resources 
(Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, 
2002; Ostrom, 2009). Supplies such as fresh water, fish, or 
fossil fuels may form the basis for survival, and a sustain-
able balance between exploitation and conservation 
must be found. Game-theory formulations typically 
assume that such dilemmas pit the self-interested objec-
tives of individuals against the interests of their commu-
nity (Burke, 2001; Hardin, 1968; Kollock, 1998). Such 
approaches tend to highlight outcomes illustrating the 
tragedy of the commons, in which resources are eventu-
ally exhausted, to the disadvantage of both individuals 
and their social groups (Hardin, 1968). Field studies, 
however, demonstrate that community members typically 
find ways to manage resource-harvesting behaviors 
through simple coordination, regulation, or sanctions 
(Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Ostrom, 2000; 
Rankin, Bargum, & Kokko, 2007). In the study reported 
here, we examined the neurochemical mechanisms that 
mediate how individuals interact with others to manage 
common-pool resources.
One neurochemical that might modulate the way that 
individuals solve resource dilemmas is serotonin. 
Increased serotonin activity—achieved by administration 
of the amino acid tryptophan in vervet monkeys (Raleigh, 
McGuire, Brammer, Pollack, & Yuwiler, 1991) and the 
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Abstract
How do people sustain resources for the benefit of individuals and communities and avoid the tragedy of the commons, 
in which shared resources become exhausted? In the present study, we examined the role of serotonin activity and social 
norms in the management of depletable resources. Healthy adults, alongside social partners, completed a multiplayer 
resource-dilemma game in which they repeatedly harvested from a partially replenishable monetary resource. Dietary 
tryptophan depletion, leading to reduced serotonin activity, was associated with aggressive harvesting strategies and 
disrupted use of the social norms given by distributions of other players’ harvests. Tryptophan-depleted participants 
more frequently exhausted the resource completely and also accumulated fewer rewards than participants who were 
not tryptophan depleted. Our findings show that rank-based social comparisons are crucial to the management of 
depletable resources, and that serotonin mediates responses to social norms.
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selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor paroxetine in 
humans (Knutson et al., 1998)—can facilitate affiliative 
behaviors. By contrast, reduced serotonin activity 
(achieved by tryptophan depletion) blocks reciprocal 
altruism in humans (Wood, Rilling, Sanfey, Bhagwagar, & 
Rogers, 2006) and facilitates the punishment of unfair-
ness in ways comparable with focal lesions of the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex, a cortical region that receives 
dense serotonergic innervation (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, 
Lieberman, & Robbins, 2008; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). 
Reduced serotonin activity also diminishes the reward 
value of fairness, but enhances the tendency to punish 
unfairness, via modulated activity within the ventral and 
dorsal striatum, respectively (Crockett et al., 2013). Taken 
together, these data suggest that serotonin activity regu-
lates a tension between fairness and norm-enforcing 
retaliation to influence how people work to meet group-
based objectives, such as managing resources.
We tested the effects of diminishing central serotonin 
activity (through tryptophan depletion; Moore et al., 
2000) on the capacity of healthy adults to solve resource 
dilemmas within small social groups. Participants were 
introduced to three people (in fact, experimental confed-
erates), and the four-player group was given access to a 
resource of nominal value (points) that could be har-
vested and, after the experiment, converted into mone-
tary payoffs. On each harvesting opportunity, group 
members decided how much to harvest from the resource, 
which was reduced by the total value of the group’s har-
vests but then replenished.
Our focus was the role of serotonin in descriptive 
social norms. Comparisons with social partners’ behavior 
may be important in resource-management problems 
(Biel & Thøgersen, 2007; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; 
Thøgersen, 2008), as when people are nudged into 
reducing their energy consumption by being told that 
they are using more energy than their neighbors (Nolan, 
Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). People 
can also be highly sensitive to their ranked position 
within distributions of behavior (here called social norms; 
Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Melrose, Brown, & Wood, 
2012; Wood, Boyce, Moore, & Brown, 2012). We hypoth-
esized that social ranks would be important when people 
chose how much to harvest from a shared resource. We 
tested the hypotheses that people would adjust their cur-
rent harvests (in an upward or downward direction) on 
the basis of the (ranked) position of their previous har-
vests within the social norm represented by the distribu-
tion of group members’ harvests, and that these 
adjustments would be influenced by central serotonin 
activity.
To vary the social norms, we manipulated the harvest-
ing behavior of the other players (i.e., confederates) at 
different points in the resource-dilemma game. Sometimes, 
other players adopted aggressive overharvesting strategies 
that depleted the resource and that would, if prolonged, 
have exhausted the resource completely. At other times, 
other players adopted conservative underharvesting strat-
egies that increased the resource (early in the game) or 
tended to sustain its value (toward the end of the game). 
This experimentally induced variation in other people’s 
harvesting behavior allowed us to assess participants’ use 
of social norms.
Method
The experiment was approved by a National Health 
Service (England) research ethics committee. Participants 
provided informed consent after reading an information 
sheet indicating that the experiment would involve mak-
ing decisions as part of a small group but not specifying 
all the details of, or the rationale for playing, the multi-
player resource-dilemma game.
Participants
Rapid dietary tryptophan depletion diminishes central 
serotonin activity reliably and safely in healthy adult vol-
unteers (Moore et al., 2000). Thirty-two healthy adults 
were recruited from Oxford University and the local com-
munity; 24 were full-time students. All participants fol-
lowed a low-protein diet for 24 hr before ingesting an 
amino-acid drink on the morning of the experiment. The 
drink consumed by 16 of the participants contained tryp-
tophan (the T+ group), and the drink consumed by the 
other 16 did not contain tryptophan (the T– group; see 
the Supplemental Material available online for details). 
Five hours later, participants played the multiplayer 
resource-dilemma game. The participants, experimenter, 
and confederates were all unaware of which treatment 
participants received.
Procedure
In an initial session, all participants were assessed using 
a semistructured interview from the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). Exclusion criteria included 
the presence or history of serious physical or psychiatric 
illness, including mood and addictive disorders. 
Participants completed measures of cognitive ability 
(Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Sets A, B, C, D, & 
E; Raven, 1996) and impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995).
On the morning of the experiment, participants arrived 
at the laboratory at 8:30 a.m. and completed self-report 
measures of state affect using the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Blood samples (6 ml) were taken for baseline 
measurements of plasma tryptophan. Participants then 
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drank the amino-acid drinks over 30 min and occupied 
themselves with reading or watching television. Five 
hours later, immediately prior to the start of the resource-
dilemma game, follow-up measures of state affect were 
taken, as well as a second blood sample.
All four players (i.e., the participant and three confed-
erates) sat at separate workstations around a pentagonal 
table, with each person’s position identified by labels (A, 
B, C, and D). The experimenter sat at the fifth worksta-
tion (Fig. 1a). Each workstation contained a computer 
terminal, and dividers concealed other players’ displays 
and keyboard finger movements (Fig. 1b) but not their 
faces. First names of players, but no other information, 
were known among the group before the game began. 
To enhance the deception that the other three players of 
the game were genuine, we trained participants along-
side one opposite-gender confederate but informed them 
that the two remaining players (one male, one female) 
were being trained elsewhere. This procedure avoided 
both the possibly unhelpful effects of being instructed as 
ba
230 230 225
Experimenter Experimenter
Experimenter
Total Points: 0 Total Points: 10 Total Points: 10
All Players Harvest
From Resource
Participants See
Others’ Harvest
Resource Is
Replenished
c
10
Fig. 1. Setup of the multiplayer resource-dilemma game and an example harvesting opportunity. The photographs show (a) the positions of 
the four players (a participant and three confederates) around the workstation where the game was played and (b) a single participant view-
ing an example display. In the example harvesting opportunity (c), the letter A indicates the position of the participant at the workstation; 
the three confederates are represented by B, C, and D, respectively. Throughout the game, the current value of the resource was shown in 
the center of the pentagon. During the harvesting phase (left panel), participants had 5 s to choose how much to harvest from the resource 
and enter that amount in the box marked “Select your take:.” This was followed by the 1.5-s observation phase (middle panel), in which the 
amount each player chose was displayed in red next to his or her identifying letter, and then the participant’s chosen amount was added to 
his or her total points. The resource was then partially replenished (right panel). Replenishment was signaled by a mauve border appearing 
around the pentagon and the sounding of a 0.5-s tone.
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part of a larger group (e.g., by making it easier for partici-
pants to ask questions) and improved the believability of 
the game by making participants aware of confederates’ 
involvement before they took their seats for the game 
proper. All groups included two male and two female 
players.
Participants and confederates were given access to a 
resource, initially of 230 points. On every harvesting 
opportunity, each player took up to 20 points from the 
resource. Participants were told that these points, accu-
mulated over the whole game, could be exchanged for a 
real monetary reward at the end of the experiment (up to 
a maximum value of £15).
Participants made their harvesting decisions privately, 
but subsequently observed all other players’ harvests. 
Participants could see their own (but not others’) total 
number of accumulated points at all times during the 
game. Players were explicitly told that the group as a 
whole, and they as individuals, would make more points 
if the group were able to find a way to sustain the 
resource over the course of the game. They were also 
told that the game would terminate when either the 
resource was reduced to 0 or an unknown time interval 
had elapsed. In fact, the game terminated automatically 
after 109 consecutive harvests.
Figure 1c shows a typical display sequence. Throughout 
the game, the current value of the resource was shown in 
the center of a light-blue pentagon. The value partici-
pants selected for the current harvest was shown below 
the pentagon. On each harvesting opportunity, partici-
pants were allowed to harvest points by pressing the up-
arrow and down-arrow keys of a keyboard to scroll 
through integer values. (The confederates pretended to 
harvest points in the same manner, although their har-
vests were actually decided by the computer.) The har-
vest was the value selected 5 s after the appearance of 
the display. Two seconds later, the value of the partici-
pant’s harvest was added to his or her accumulated total 
points. One second after that, all four players’ harvests 
were displayed in red alongside the letters that indicated 
their position around the table. The resource was updated 
1.5 s later by subtracting the summed value of all har-
vests, and then the resource was at least partially replen-
ished (see the next paragraph). This event was signaled 
by changing the pentagon color border to mauve and 
playing a 0.5-s tone. Harvesting opportunities were sepa-
rated by 1.5-s intervals.
The replenishment operated as follows. First, the 
resource was increased by a number of points drawn 
from a rectangular distribution of integers between 17% 
and 23% of the resource that remained following all play-
ers’ harvests. Second, the value of the replenished 
resource was weighted by one-third of the previous 
resource value. This running-total mechanism dampened 
fluctuations in resource value over the course of the 
game, increased the number of harvesting opportunities 
that participants were likely to complete in a game, and 
facilitated the emergence of stable resource-management 
strategies (see the Supplemental Material for an example 
replenishment).
Communication between playing partners was not 
allowed during the game, and confederates maintained 
their focus of attention on the game displays throughout. 
All players were told to press the space bar on their key-
boards to start the game. In fact, the computer controlling 
the experiment responded only to the participants’ but-
ton responses. All players wore headphones, which pro-
vided sound effects for the game and background music 
(Mozart concertos) to reduce possible noise distractions.
The over- and underharvesting behavior of confeder-
ates instantiated four social environments (see the 
Supplemental Material for details). In the one-overhar-
vester environment, a single confederate overharvested 
the resource (e.g., Fig. 1c); in the two-overharvesters 
environment, two confederates overharvested the 
resource. By contrast, in the one-underharvester environ-
ment, one confederate underharvested the resource, 
whereas, in the two-underharvesters environment, two 
confederates underharvested the resource. Overharvesting 
by confederates was geared (assuming that the harvests 
of the remaining players had no impact) to diminish the 
resource, whereas underharvesting behavior was geared 
to increase the resource. Therefore, the value of the 
resource available to the players tended to decrease in 
the overharvesting environments but increase in the 
underharvesting environments. In each social environ-
ment, all other players (i.e., any confederates who were 
not saliently over- or underharvesting) harvested amounts 
that, by themselves, placed a gentle downward pressure 
on the value of the resource. (Extensive pilot studies sug-
gested that healthy adults tend to overharvest from a 
shared resource, other things being equal, and we wanted 
participants to be required to manage resources that 
were under a mild threat of exhaustion.)
There were 13 consecutive harvesting opportunities in 
each of the four harvesting environments. The four envi-
ronments were presented in a pseudorandom order over 
the 109 harvests of the game (up to two repetitions of 
each environment). One-overharvester environments 
never immediately preceded or followed two-overhar-
vesters environments; one-underharvester environments 
never immediately preceded or followed two-underhar-
vesters environments. The first five harvests of the game 
were warm-ups, in which the harvests of playing partners 
maintained the resource at roughly its initial level.
After finishing the resource-dilemma game, partici-
pants completed a postgame questionnaire to measure 
their satisfaction with the game and the strategies that 
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they employed. Participants rated three items: “How 
happy were you with the outcome of the game?” “How 
much did you feel that you wanted to act in your own 
benefit when selecting your ‘take’?” and “How much did 
you feel that you thought of the best outcome for the 
group when selecting your ‘take’?” Responses were made 
using 7-point Likert scales, with the anchors not at all (0) 
and very much (6) and a midpoint of somewhat (3).
Results
There were no significant differences in the age, cogni-
tive ability, trait affect, or impulsivity of T– and T+ par-
ticipants (Table 1), −1.26 (SE = 1.43) < βs < 4.71 (SE = 
2.96). As expected (Moore et al., 2000), plasma (total) 
tryptophan between baseline (immediately before 
receiving the amino-acid drink) and 5 hr later was 
reduced following the T– treatment but increased follow-
ing the T+ treatment (see Table S1 in the Supplemental 
Material), β = −14.66 (SE = 1.26), p < .0001. Plasma tryp-
tophan was reduced in the T– compared with the T+ 
participants just before participants began the resource-
dilemma game, β  = −14.38 (SE = 1.08), p < .0001. 
Consistent with previous findings (Booij et al., 2002; 
Ruhe, Mason, & Schene, 2007), results showed that the 
T– treatment did not produce marked changes in state 
positive or negative affect (Table S1 in the Supplemental 
Material), −1.88 (SE = 3.20) < βs < −0.94 (SE = 0.86). All 
participants reported being deceived about the veracity 
of the confederates’ behavior, as indicated by scores of 4 
or higher on the measure of deception. Deception scores 
for T+ participants (M = 6.71, SE = 0.18) and T– partici-
pants (M = 6.33, SE = 0.33) were not significantly differ-
ent, β = 0.40 (SE = 0.41).
Tryptophan depletion and resource-
dilemma outcomes
First, we compared the outcomes of the resource-
dilemma game and the total points harvested by 
the T– participants and the T+ participants. Eight of the 
T– participants (50% of the group) exhausted the 
resource completely, compared with only 2 of the T+ 
participants (12.5%), χ2(1, N = 32) = 5.24, p = .022. The 
T– participants also accumulated fewer points by the 
end of the game (Fig. 2a), β = −294.06 (SE = 79.39), p = 
.0002, and finished the game with smaller final resource 
values than the T+ participants (see Fig. 2b), β = −122.42 
(SE = 43.06), p = .0045.
Thus, reductions in serotonin activity, achieved by 
tryptophan depletion, induced a bias toward aggressive 
harvesting behaviors that, in extremis, exhausted the 
shared resource completely. Overall, there was little evi-
dence that the resource outcomes were consistently 
related to total or subscale scores of motor, attentional, 
and nonplanning impulsivity in either treatment group 
(–.25 < rs < .44); however, T– participants with higher 
nonplanning impulsivity scores did tend to accumulate 
larger totals of reward by the end of the game (r = .57, 
p = .02, uncorrected for the eight Pearson’s correlation 
tests conducted).
Tryptophan depletion and sensitivity 
to social norms
To explore the effects of social norms further, we con-
structed regression models of the structural (and social) 
features of the game that influenced how participants 
adjusted their harvests from one harvesting opportunity 
to the next (Table 2; see the Supplemental Material for 
further details). Regressors included terms to code (a) the 
value of participants’ own immediately preceding har-
vests; (b) the current value of the available resource; 
(c) the presence of one or two other players who were 
overharvesting, modeled as a binary indicator (with the 
presence of one or two other players who were under-
harvesting as the referent); (d) the rank of participants’ 
last harvest within the distribution of all four players’ last 
harvests (i.e., their position within the social norms; see 
Fig. 3); and (e) the T– treatment, modeled as a binary 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Participants Who Consumed Amino-Acid Drinks Containing (T+) or Not Containing (T–) 
Tryptophan
Treatment group Gender Mean age (years)
Mean Raven’s
matrices score
Mean BIS-11  
score
Mean PANAS trait score
Positive affect Negative affect
T+ 7 male,
9 female
24.44 (1.65) 55.53 (1.17) 58.00 (2.22) 34.44 (0.96) 13.94 (0.91)
T– 9 male,
7 female
23.56 (0.92) 56.63 (0.80) 62.56 (1.86) 37.00 (1.22) 14.56 (1.06)
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Participants completed measures of cognitive ability (Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Sets A, 
B, C, D, & E; Raven, 1996), impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, or BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), and positive and negative state 
affect (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, or PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
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indicator with the T+ treatment as the referent. (Statistical 
significance was tested against a threshold of p < .05; 
bootstrapped models that provided 95% confidence 
intervals for the coefficients described below can be 
found in Table S2 in the Supplemental Material.)
Model 1 showed that T+ participants tended to harvest 
more from higher value resources than from lower value 
resources (Table 2), β = 0.02 (SE = 0.001), p < .0001, and 
this behavior was not markedly altered in the T– com-
pared with the T+ participants, β = 0.001 (SE = 0.002). 
However, tryptophan depletion did diminish the 
conditionality of cooperation seen in other common-
pool problems (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). 
Specifically, the T+ participants tended to reduce their 
harvests when they had taken larger harvests on the pre-
ceding harvesting opportunity, β = −0.69 (SE = 0.03), 
Table 2. Results of the Regression Analysis Predicting Participants’ Adjustments in Their Harvests
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2
T+ treatment only
T+ treatment vs.  
T– treatment T+ treatment only
T+ treatment vs.  
T– treatment
Intercept 0.75 (0.26)** — 0.79 (0.53) —
Treatment group — –0.29 (0.38) — –0.71 (0.56)
Value of participant’s own 
immediately preceding harvest
–0.69 (0.03)**** 0.07 (0.03)* –0.66 (0.04)**** —
Current value of available resource 0.02 (0.001)**** 0.001 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) —
Presence of one or two other 
players who were overharvesting
0.88 (0.15)**** –0.39 (0.22) 0.80 (0.20)**** —
Rank of participants’ last harvest 
within the distribution of all four 
players’ last harvests (Rankn–1)
— — –6.56 (3.33)* 10.14 (4.66)*
(Rankn–1)
2 — — 18.28 (7.35)* –23.73 (10.39)*
(Rankn–1)
3 — — –13.11 (4.83)** 15.66 (6.68)*
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown, and standard errors are given in parentheses. For the group that consumed the amino-acid 
drink containing tryptophan (T+; n = 16), there were 1,569 observations; for the group that consumed the amino-acid drink that did not contain 
tryptophan (T–; n = 16), there were 1,217 observations.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ****p < .0001.
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Fig. 2. Mean total number of points harvested (a) and mean final resource value (b) at the end of the 
multiplayer resource-dilemma game as a function of whether participants consumed (T+) or did not 
consume (T–) a drink containing the serotonin precursor tryptophan. Error bars show standard errors. 
Asterisks indicate a significant difference between conditions (∗∗∗p < .005).
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p < .0001, but then tended to increase their harvests 
when one or two other players were overharvesting, β = 
0.88 (SE = 0.15), p < .0001. These behaviors indicate that 
the T+ participants’ willingness to moderate their own 
harvesting was, in general, limited by the aggressive har-
vesting of other players. By contrast, the tendency to 
reduce, or self-correct, harvests immediately following 
larger harvests was attenuated in the T– participants, β = 
0.07 (SE = 0.03), p = .02. These observations, together 
with the fact that a greater number of T– compared with 
T+ participants exhausted the resource completely, indi-
cates that temporary reduction of serotonin activity 
induces aggressive but less flexible harvesting strategies 
when people manage valuable resources.
Of particular interest was whether participants’ har-
vests were sensitive to the ranked position of their own 
harvest amounts within the social norms and whether 
this sensitivity can be disrupted by temporary disruptions 
of serotonergic neuromodulation. We hypothesized that 
participants used the value of all four players’ previous 
harvests to estimate the social norm currently operating 
within the resource-dilemma game. These social norms 
were modeled as beta distributions; that is, we fitted beta 
distributions, scaled between 0 and 20, to each set of four 
harvests from each harvesting opportunity, and we used 
that distribution to represent the social norm. Figure 3 
illustrates this process in an overharvesting (Fig. 3a) and 
an underharvesting (Fig. 3b) environment (see also 
Fig. S1 in the Supplemental Material).
We found exactly this predicted pattern. Figure 4 
shows the adjustment in participants’ harvests from one 
harvesting opportunity to the next, ΔHarvest, as a func-
tion of the rank of their last harvest, separately for each 
participant. Our prediction was clearly confirmed in the 
behavior of the majority of the T+ participants. Moreover, 
Model 2 showed that the relationship between the two 
factors tended to be markedly nonlinear, as indicated by 
significant regression coefficients for the three elements 
of a polynomial (Table 2), β = −6.56 (SE = 3.33), β = 18.28 
(SE = 7.35), β = −13.11 (SE = 4.83), all ps < .05. The T+ 
participants made the largest upward and downward 
adjustments to their harvests when the value of their last 
harvest fell toward the bottom or top of the distributions 
of other players’ harvests, respectively. By comparison, 
the T– participants’ harvests tended to rank toward the 
top of these distributions and showed only inconsistent 
use of the social norms in adjusting subsequent harvests 
(Table 2), β = 10.14 (SE = 4.66), β = −23.73 (SE = 10.39), 
β = 15.66 (SE = 6.68), all ps < .03.
Effects of treatment on motor 
responding
Treatment-related changes in resource management or in 
the sensitivity to social comparisons following trypto-
phan depletion could not be attributed to heightened 
motor impulsivity. Neither the speed of the first harvest-
ing response (T– participants: M = 0.20 s, SE = 0.046; 
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Fig. 3. Illustration of descriptive social norms: (a) overharvesting and (b) underharvesting social environments 
of the multiplayer resource-dilemma game. Each panel shows four harvests (dots) and a probability density 
function (PDF; beta distributions scaled to between 0 and 20) representing the corresponding social norms. 
Relative rank is the position of a harvest of 12 (green dot) in the cumulative PDFs of the two different social 
norms. The vertical lines highlight the lower ranking of a harvest of 12 in the (a) overharvesting environment 
than in the (b) underharvesting environment.
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T+ participants: M = 0.22 s, SE = 0.05) nor the number of 
button presses per harvest opportunity (T– participants: 
M = 2.89, SE = 0.21; T+ participants: M = 2.75, SE = 0.25) 
were significantly altered as a function of treatment con-
dition, −0.04 (SE = 0.06) < βs < 0.09 (SE = 0.320).
Postgame self-report of motivations 
and objectives
Finally, participants who received the T– treatment were 
equally happy with the outcome of the resource-dilemma 
game (M = 4.31, SE = 0.24), compared with those who 
received the T+ treatment (M = 4.25, SE = 0.25), β = −0.14 
(SE = 0.34). Similarly, the two treatment groups reported 
acting for their own benefit to a similar extent (T– partici-
pants: M = 4.25, SE = 0.27; T+ participants: M = 3.56, SE = 
0.36), β = 0.55 (SE = 0.41). However, the T– participants 
did report thinking less about the best outcome for the 
group when completing the game (M = 2.75, SE = 0.34) 
than the T+ participants did (M = 4.00, SE = 0.41), β = 
−1.11 (SE = 0.50), p < .05.
Discussion
In the present experiment, we used a laboratory multi-
player resource-dilemma game and tryptophan depletion 
to demonstrate that reduced central serotonin activity 
compromises people’s sensitivity to descriptive social 
norms while they are managing valuable but depletable 
resources within small social groups. Individuals who 
received the T– treatment tended to deplete the shared 
resources to a significantly greater extent, and accumu-
late fewer rewards over the course of the game, than 
individuals who received the T+ treatment. At its most 
dramatic, this behavior involved aggressive overharvest-
ing that exhausted groups’ resources completely.
We tested the hypothesis that people use their own 
and others’ harvesting behavior to construct distributions 
that specify the social norms within resource dilemmas 
and then use the ranks of their own harvests within these 
distributions to guide decisions about how much to take 
from the resource. Our data support this hypothesis: T+ 
participants increased the amount they harvested when 
the value of their last harvest was ranked toward the 
lower tail of these distributions, but decreased the amount 
they harvested when the value of their last harvest was 
ranked toward the upper tail. The use of rank-based social 
norms, however, tended to be disrupted in the T– partici-
pants, whose harvests clustered at high ranks toward the 
upper end of the estimated distributions of other peoples’ 
harvests, with only inconsistent (downward) adjustments 
in their subsequent harvests. Our results do not reflect 
changes in state affect or motor impulsivity following 
tryptophan depletion (Moore et al., 2000). Thus, to the 
best of our knowledge, these data constitute the first evi-
dence of a neurochemical— specifically, serotonergic—
mechanism underpinning resource management in 
human groups.
Converging evidence that tryptophan depletion sup-
pressed the regulation of harvesting through diminished 
sensitivity to social norms is provided by the observation 
that, whereas the T– and T+ participants were equally 
happy with the outcomes of their resource-dilemma 
games and reported acting for their own benefit to a very 
similar extent, the T– participants reported significantly 
less concern about the best outcome for the wider group 
of players than the T+ participants. This suggests that their 
relatively poor performance, in being more likely to 
exhaust the resource completely, was paralleled by a 
reduction in the evaluated worth of the group objective of 
managing the resource effectively for the collective good.
Further research will be needed to identify the precise 
psychological mechanisms modulated by serotonin to 
influence resource management. Our data provided only 
very limited evidence that tryptophan depletion altered 
resource-management outcomes to a greater extent in 
participants with higher psychometric scores of impulsiv-
ity. However, the tendency to overharvest following tryp-
tophan depletion may still reflect enhanced temporal 
discounting (Schweighofer et al., 2008; Tanaka et al., 
2007), leading to preferences for larger immediate har-
vests at the expense of preserving the resources for the 
long term. Overharvesting in the T– participants, irre-
spective of social norms, may also be linked to the 
broader aggressive behaviors sometimes observed fol-
lowing tryptophan depletion, although such effects are 
strongest in samples specifically selected for high-trait 
aggression (Dougherty, Bjork, Marsh, & Moeller, 1999). 
Finally, our sample consisted predominantly of students 
(both domestic and international), which raises the pos-
sibility that their behavior in our resource-dilemma game 
(following the T+ or T– treatments) was conditioned by 
cultural factors (Zhu, Gigerenzer, & Huangfu, 2013).
Our laboratory multiplayer resource-dilemma game 
was also only a very approximate model of real-world 
resource dilemmas, as it involved no immediate survival 
or economic imperatives (Committee on the Human 
Dimensions of Global Change, 2002; Gardiner, 2001; 
Ostrom, 2009) or sanctions known to promote socially 
cooperative behavior in common-pool problems (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). Our game also afforded complete infor-
mation about the harvesting behavior of other players, 
which allowed participants to estimate social norms 
accurately. In real-world resource dilemmas, the value of 
resources harvested by social partners can be uncertain, 
which can potentially increase the salience of other 
sources of information—such as fluctuations in the 
resource value over time—in decisions about harvesting 
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strategies ( Jager, Janssen, & Vlek, 2002). However, as in 
previous experiments (Barclay, 2004; Campbell, Bush, 
Brunell, & Shelton, 2005), our game was intended to 
model only some of the psychosocial processes—in this 
instance, the social norms—that influence the way that 
people cope with real-life resource-management prob-
lems and to demonstrate how these processes are modu-
lated by serotonergic activity.
In summary, notwithstanding the preceding limita-
tions, our findings indicate that serotonin activity is impli-
cated in the ability of human adults to use social norms 
to manage, as part of an interdependent group, finite but 
valuable resources.
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